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Regulations Are a Drag: The WHO Framework
Convention on Tobacco Control and its Potential
Application to Electronic Cigarettes
Kevin Oliver'
Abstract
The Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) aims to protectpresent and
future generationsfromthe consequences of tobacco consumption and exposure to tobacco smoke.
While the trea~'y has enjojyed widespreadadherence, the rise in popularioy of electronic cgarettes
presents new questions about its scope. These relativey new products do not contain anj tobacco
and are thus not a major focus of the FCTC. This Comment examines provisions of the
FCTC that may authorize its possible application to e-czgaretes and concludes that the treay
has the power to regulate them 6f scienlific consensus suggests that such regulation would he
"effective."
The scientific community is divided on the issue of e-cigarette regulation. Scholars and
poligymakers have sometimes invoked the precautionay principle (essentialy, a "better safe
than sony"philosophy) to justif internationalregulation in the face of scientific uncertainy.
This Comment addresses the precautionayprinciple's lack of utility in the e-cdgarette context
and ultimatey recommends against additional regulation under the FCTC. The current
scholarship has not addressed the applicabilioy of the FCTC to e-cigarettes, so this Comment
sheds light on a potentiallypowerful internationalinstrumentfor the regulation of a relatively
new, popular,andpossiby dangerousproduct.

J.D. Candidate, 2016, The University of Chicago Law School. The author would like to thank the
Chicago Jounal of International Law staff for their guidance, support, comments, and critiques
throughout the writing process.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

In the past decade, Electronic Nicotine Delivery Systems (ENDS), or ecigarettes, have rapidly gained popularity worldwide, presenting unique
challenges to both domestic and international regulatory bodies. Although these
battery-powered products do not contain tobacco, they deliver vaporized
nicotine to a user's lungs, creating familiar concerns about addiction.1 Ecigarettes are frequently marketed as a healthier alternative to traditional tobacco
products, but the scientific community has yet to reach many firm conclusions
on the actual long-term health effects of these relatively new devices.2 Different
countries and local governmental bodies currently employ varying legislative
approaches to e-cigarettes, ranging from no regulation at all3 to outright bans on
advertising and flavored e-cigarettes. 4
Traditional tobacco products are the most useful analogue for analyzing
the legal status of e-cigarettes, as the latter were specifically designed to replace
the former.5 Unlike e-cigarettes, traditional tobacco products fall under an
extensive body of international guidelines and directives for controlling
consumption. The most significant source of these is the World Health
Organization (WHO) Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC).6
The FCTC, which came into force in 2005, is the first international health treaty.
It aims "to protect present and future generations from the devastating health,
social, environmental and economic consequences of tobacco consumption and
exposure to tobacco smoke." 7 As defined in the treaty, "tobacco products"
I
2

3

4

5
6

7

See Daniel F. Hardin, Blowing Electronic Smoke: Electronic Cigarettes, Regulation, and Protecting the Public
Health, 2011 U. ILL.J.L. TECH. & POL'Y 433, 437.
See id. at 447.
See Electronic Cigarette Industry Trade Association, Summay of Legal Rulings and Case Precedents
(Sept.
2013),
available
at
http://ecita.org.uk/sites/default/files/sites/default/files/u41 /Summary%20of
%20case%20precedents%20and%201egal%20rulings%20September%202013.pdf
(summarizing
court rulings invalidating attempts to regulate e-cigarettes as medicines in Germany, the
Netherlands, and Estonia).
See Mike Esterl, States Urge Tougher Curbs on E-Cigarettes, WAL. ST. J. (Aug. 8, 2014),
http://www.wsj.com/artices/state-attorneys-general-urge-tougher-curbs-on-e-cigarettes1407514160; Teena Thacker, E-Cigarettesset to be banned in India soon, DECCAN CHRONICLE (Aug.
19, 2014), http://www.deccanchronicle.com/140818/nation-current-affairs/article/e-cigarettesset-be-banned-india-soon; see also discussion infra Section III.D.
See Barbara Demick, A High-Tech Approach to Geting a Nicotine Fix, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 25, 2009),
http://articles.latimes.com/2009/apr/25/world/fg-china-cigarettes25.
World Health Organization [WHO] Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, May 21, 2003,
2302 U.N.T.S. 166, available at http://www.who.int/tobacco/framework/fctcen.pdfua=1
lhereinafter FCTCJ.
Id.art. 3.
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include "products entirely or partly made of the leaf tobacco as raw material
8
which are manufactured to be used for smoking, sucking, chewing or snuffing."
This definition leaves unanswered the question whether e-cigarettes may be
classified as a tobacco product, as they contain only nicotine derived from
tobacco, not tobacco itself. The answer to this question may have a significant
effect on the overall effectiveness of the FCTC, insofar as e-cigarettes are used
as a substitute for traditional tobacco products. Laws regulating the use,
marketing, and sale of e-cigarettes could influence future trends in smoking, and
if the FCTC is a legitimate source of e-cigarette regulation, it may shape the
behavioral patterns of users and would-be users of both traditional tobacco
products and e-cigarettes.
Separate from the inquiry of whether the principles and obligations of the
FCTC can apply to e-cigarettes are the questions of whether and how they should
apply. The complexity of these problems is illustrated by the myriad approaches
different governments have taken, and the lack of a scientific consensus on the
health effects of e-cigarette consumption. 9 If the FCTC is in fact a legitimate
source of authority for creating e-cigarette policy, it could become a useful
unifying international mechanism for achieving its largely uncontroversial public
health goals. But whether the treaty's text justifies such authority depends on
whether the FCTC can realistically compel the implementation of "effective
legislative, executive, administrative and/or other measures"'" to protect
smokers and indirect victims of tobacco-related harms. The controversy that
arises in determining what constitutes an "effective" measure may render
fruitless the attempts to rely on the FCTC for e-cigarette regulation (or any other
type of regulation, for that matter).
In spite of the enforceability questions that are ubiquitous in international
law and which appear to be particularly prevalent in the realm of e-cigarette
regulation, the governing body of the FCTC has undertaken efforts to shape ecigarette policies. The most recent Conference of the Parties (COP) ENDS
Report recommends "a two-pronged regulatory strategy-regulating ENDS as
both a tobacco product, in accordance with the provisions of the WHO FCTC,

8

Id.art. 1.

9

See Daniela Saitta et al., Achieving appropriateregulalionsforelectronic rigarettes, 5 THER. ADV. CHRONIC
Dis. 50, 52 (2014), available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/artices/PMC3926346/
("Rulings of national and international bodies around the world range from no regulation at all to
complete bans.') (citation omitted); Michael Freiberg, Options for State and Local Governments to
RegulateNon-CigaretteTobacco Products, 21 ANNALS HEAITH L. 407, 436 (2012) ("[Tlhe health effects
of nicotine-infused water vapor being expelled into the air are poorly understood at best .....
FCTC, supra note 6, art. 8 (emphasis added).

10
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and as a medical product."11 Whether the international community will embrace
such an approach remains to be seen, but if the COP takes a firmer stance and
announces that the FCTC requires this type of regulation, the treaty's signatories
may be bound.
This Comment will assess the current international state of e-cigarette
regulation and the potential of the FCTC to further shape such regulation. While
it appears that the FCTC's obligations are binding on signatory states, 12 the
correct use of this power is not to equate e-cigarettes with traditional tobacco
products. This Comment argues that it would be more consistent with the
WHO's aims to prohibitmany proposed legislative measures to restrict e-cigarette
usage, and that the best alternative, given likely political resistance, is to take no
action at all.
Section II of the Comment will introduce key components of the FCTC
and how they may be relevant to the debate over the treaty's application to ecigarettes. This section also examines the high rate of compliance with the
Convention, demonstrating its binding nature and potential to meaningfully
affect e-cigarette regulation worldwide. Section III provides an overview of
current e-cigarette regulation internationally, examining sources of confusion as
to the most effective regulation and the continuing need for guidance. Section
IV more specifically describes the WHO's attempts to regulate e-cigarettes up to
this point, as well as the textual basis for holding that such regulation is legally
viable. Section V examines the scientific and scholarly debate surrounding ecigarette regulation to determine whether such regulation can be considered
"effective" under the terms of the FCTC. This section will also discuss the
precautionary principle, a "[b]etter safe than sorry" adage often employed to
support regulation of potentially harmful practices in the absence of clear

11
12

WHO Report, Electronic nicotine delivery systems, FCTC/COP/6/10, 13 (July 21, 2014), available at
http://apps.who.int/gb/fctc/PDF/cop6/FCTCCOP6_10-en.pdf.
See, for example, Sam F. Halabi, The World Health Organizalion's Framework Convention on Tobacco
Controk An Analysis of Guidelines Adopted by the Conference of the Parties, 39 GA. J. 1NT'L & COMP. L.
121, 127 (2010) (concluding that parties to the FCTC "are under an obligation to implement
treaty provisions in light of the guidelines"); JiyongJin, FCTC and China's Politics of Tobacco Control,
The 4th GLF Annual Colloquium, Princeton University, at 6 (May 15, 2012), available at
http://www.princeton.edu/-pcglobal/conferences/GLF/jin.pdf ("On 27 February, 2005, the
treaty came into force and became a binding international law after Peru became the 40th country
that had ratified the FCTC."); Workshop on Trade and Investment Issues Relevant to the WHO
Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, Background Paper, at 3 (Mar. 27, 2014), available at
http://www.who.int/fctc/2014-PMWHOFCTC-wshop-backgroundpaper.pdPua=1 ("Parties
to the WHO FCTC undertake, under international law, to implement a number of
complementary, mutually reinforcing measures for both reduction of demand for, and supply of,
tobacco products. As a treaty with 178 Parties, the WHO FCTC is a powerful instrument, both
legally and politically.").
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evidence of harm. 3 Counterintuitively, in the case of e-cigarettes, the low-risk
option appears to be a strong stance against regulation.

II.

THE FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON TOBACCO CONTROL

The FCTC has been ratified by 168 countries, which have effectively
agreed "to reduce continually and substantially the prevalence of tobacco use
and exposure to tobacco smoke."' 4 The treaty identifies itself as "evidencebased,"'" suggesting that the obligations ratification entails will change as
research related to tobacco control reveals new findings. This idea is reaffirmed
in the Convention's preamble, which states that the FCTC's parties are
"[d]etermined to promote measures of tobacco control based on current and
relevant scientific, technical and economic considerations."' 6 Therefore, the
practical elements of the treaty will necessarily evolve alongside scientific
progress in the field of tobacco control.
A. Key Provisions
Including its Introduction, the treaty consists of twelve parts, several of
which contain articles that may be relevant to the Convention's competence to
regulate e-cigarettes.
Article 5 of the FCTC lays out the general obligations that the treaty
imposes on members: "Each Party shall develop, implement, periodically update
and review comprehensive multisectoral national tobacco control strategies,
plans and programmes in accordance with this Convention and the protocols to
which it is a Party."'" While no reading of this clause hints at the treaty's
applicability to e-cigarettes, the clause is significant in illustrating the binding
nature of the Convention's terms on its members. The use of the word "shall,"
as opposed to a more permissive term, indicates that the instructions of this
article are mandates, not mere suggestions. 8 The labeling of this article's
contents as "obligations" as opposed to a more permissive term such as
"Guiding Principles"' 9 further demonstrates that members of the treaty are not

13

See Frank B. Cross, ParadoxicalPerils of the Precaufionay Prindple, 53 WASH. & LI-E L. REV. 851, 851

(1996).
14

FCTC, supranote 6, art. 3.

15

Id. fwd.

16

Id. pmbl.

17

Id. art. 5.

18

See, for example, Lexecon, Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26, 35 (1998)
("[T]he mandatory 'shall' ... normally creates an obligation impervious to judicial discretion.').
FCTC, supra note 6, art. 4.

19
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afforded discretion to ignore these directions. 20 The language of Article 5 in
particular should make the expectations of membership clear to signatories,
hopefully alleviating concerns about the weakness of the FCTC as a binding
legal mechanism.
Article 8 direcdy addresses the impetus for the creation of the FCTC: the
harms of exposure to tobacco smoke. This article requires parties to "adopt and
implement... effective legislative, executive, administrative and/or other
measures... providing for protection from exposure to tobacco smoke., 21 This
Comment discusses the extent to which the specific reference to "tobacco
smoke" limits the scope of the article, and the meaning of the word "effective,"
in Section IV.
Article 11 is a third significant portion of the FCTC because it calls for
perhaps the most controversial category of measures contemplated by the
Convention: restrictions on the packaging and labeling of tobacco products.22
This article is illustrative of the controversy surrounding the legitimacy of the
FCTC as a binding authority, as packaging and labeling laws have given rise to
legal challenges by the tobacco industry worldwide. 23 Article 11 also calls for

20

See ANTHONY AUST, MODERN TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE 30 (3d ed. 2013) ("[Mlost states now
follow a practice of manifesting their intention to conclude a treaty by consciously employing a
fairly standard form, and mandatory terminology such as . . . 'shall', 'agree', 'undertake', 'rights',
'obligations' and 'enter into force."').

21

FCTC, supra note 6, art. 8.2.

22

See id. art. 11.

23

There appears to be particularly strong resistance in Latin America. See InterAmerican Heart
Foundation, Framework Convention on Tobacco Control: Challenges for Latin America and the
Caribbean, Civil Society Report 2010, available at http://www.ficargentina.org/images/
stories/Documentos/reportecmct-inglesl .pdf.
Philip
Morris
has
challenged
the
constitutionality of Uruguay's warning requirements, arguing that the requirements devalue the
cigarette company's trademarks and investments in Uruguay. Philip Morris Products S.A.v.
Oriental Government of Uruguay, ARB/10/7, I.C.S.I.D. (2010). A similar suit has been filed in
Paraguay, and several other ratifying members of the FCTC have delayed implementation of the
package warning requirements. See InterAmerican Heart Foundation, supra.
There is no lack of private opposition to packaging laws outside of Latin America either. Philip
Morris launched a lawsuit against Australia after the Government passed its 2011 Tobacco Plain
Packaging Bill in accordance with FCTC guidelines. Philip Morris Asia limited v. Commonwealth
of Australia, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 2012-12 (2012). Likewise, though the EU has decided
to implement plain packaging laws pursuant to the FCTC, there remains a "legal war of the
tobacco manufacturers, who will be using allavailable instruments such as lobbying, investment
claims and aggressive advertisement campaigns to undermine plain packaging." Peter K. Henning
& Leonid Shmatenko, Plain Packaging on Its Way to Europe: Competence Issues and Compatibiliy with
European Fundamental Rights, 9 TiANSNAT'I. DISPUTE MGMT. 1, 12 (2012). In favor of the FCTC,
however, is the fact that most of the challenges to Article 11's demands come from the tobacco
industry, whereas governmental action has largely been consistent with the treaty.
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"effective" measures regarding packaging and labeling.24 If packaging and
labeling requirements have no effect on tobacco consumption, then the fact that
the FCTC enjoys general support from governments is meaningless. If the
requirements have an undesirable impact on tobacco consumption, then Article
11 may actually call for packaging policies that specifically elevate the perception
of e-cigarettes above that of traditional tobacco products, a possibility that is
discussed in Section V.
Article 12 addresses the education, communication, training, and public
awareness of tobacco control issues.25 While this article does not appear to be
directly related to any issues of the treaty's legitimacy or to e-cigarette regulation,
it may actually be relevant to discussion of the latter topic. One of the major
concerns surrounding the increasing use of e-cigarettes, particularly by teenagers,
is that their consumption will renormalize smoking.26 If there is evidence that ecigarettes actually do have this normalization effect, then the FCTC's text may
justify policies aimed at educating the public about the dangers of e-cigarettes as
a gateway to tobacco use.
Article 13 states that "[e]ach Party shall, in accordance with its constitution
or constitutional principles, undertake a comprehensive ban of all tobacco
advertising, promotion, and sponsorship., 27 The text of this article does not
render Article 11 superfluous. The packaging and labeling obligations refer to
warning requirements and what tobacco sellers must do, whereas Article 13
expresses what they cannot do. The FCTC defines "tobacco advertising and
promotion" as "any form of commercial communication, recommendation or
action with the aim, effect or likely effect of promoting a tobacco product or
tobacco use either directly or indirectly. 2 8 A "comprehensive ban" may
therefore seem extensive, but the "in accordance with its constitution or
constitutional principles" clause of Article 13 hedges this requirement. This
clause shows that national law can override at least some provisions of the

24

FCTC, supranote 6, art. 11.1.

25

See id.
art. 12.

26

27

See, for example, E-egarettes - An update, CPHA HEALTH DIGEST, Spring 2014, available at
http://www.cpha.ca/en/about/digest/38-1/8.aspx ("[Aidvocates against the sale of c-cigarettes
remain adamant that the product threatens to re-normalize smoking, especially in youth, and use
of e-cigarettes risks undoing years of smoking cessation gains."); World Lung Foundation, WHO
Right
to
Call for
E-Cigarette
Regulation
(Aug.
26,
2014),
available
at
http://www.worldlungfoundation.org/ht/display/ReleaseDetails/i/32757/pid/6858
("Public
health experts also are concerned that e-cigarettes will undo decades of progress in public health
by re-normalizing smoking in public and act as a gateway to cigarette use among youth.").
FCTC, supranote 6, art. 13.2.

28

Id.
art. 1(c).
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FCTC. However, the concept of expressio unius est exclusio alterius 9 works to
maintain a higher level of power in the FCTC. The explicit carve-out for
constitutional laws and principles implies that the demands of Article 13
preempt statutes, agency regulations, executive orders, local laws and the like.
Additionally, Article 13 includes specific requirements for countries that are "not
in a position to undertake a comprehensive ban due to [their] constitution or
constitutional principles." 30 Thus, the constitutional "exceptions" to FCTC
obligations are narrow and do little to undermine the Convention's authority.
Article 14 demands measures concerning the reduction of tobacco
dependence and cessation: "Each Party shall develop and disseminate
appropriate, comprehensive and integrated guidelines based on scientific
evidence and best practices, taking into account national circumstances and
priorities, and shall take effective measures to promote cessation of tobacco use
and adequate treatment for tobacco dependence." 31 This article could provide
the clearest textual support for using the FCTC as the basis for e-cigarette
policy, depending on scientific assessment of the effect of e-cigarettes on
tobacco consumption.
Article 15, which addresses illicit trade in tobacco products, 3 2 does not
directly relate to the topics at issue in this Comment. However, this article is
highly relevant to the discussion of the FCTC's binding power over its members
because it became the focus of the FCTC's first protocol, which was adopted on
November 12, 2012." 3 While the mandatory or suggestive nature of some of the
FCTC's directions is questionable, the protocols later added to the Convention
are unquestionably binding on their parties.34 Therefore, even if the FCTC
currently carries limited weight as a regulatory instrument, a future protocol on
e-cigarettes could conceivably strengthen its ability to shape policy.
Article 21 requires each party to "submit to the Conference of the
Parties... periodic reports on its implementation of this Convention."3 While

30

"A canon of construction holding that to express or include one thing implies the exclusion of the
other, or of the alternative." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
FCTC, supra note 6, art. 13.3.

31

Id. art. 14.1.

32

See id. art. 15.

33

FCTC, Protocol to Eliminate Illicit Trade in Tobacco Products (2012), available at
http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/80873/1/9789241505246_eng.pdfua= 1.
See FCTC, supra note 6, art. 33.5 ("Any protocol to the Convention shall be binding only on the
parties to the protocol in question."); see also Lukasz Gruszczynski, The WHO Protocol to Eliminate
Illicit Trade in Tobacco Products: A Next Step in International Control of Tobacco Products, 4 EUR. J. RISK
RFG. 91, 91 (2013) ("Contrary to guidelines, a protocol is binding on the Parties which accept it
and has an equal legal status to the Convention.").
FCTC, supra note 6, art. 21.

29

34

35
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this is unrelated to e-cigarettes, Article 21 reaffirms the authority and
enforceability of the FCTC by providing a vehicle to monitor compliance with
the treaty. The effectiveness of this vehicle, and the rate of compliance more
generally, are discussed later in this section.
Finally, Article 22 mandates cooperation in the scientific, technical, and
legal fields and provision of related expertise. 6 If the scientific community
comes out strongly in support of a certain policy on e-cigarettes, Article 22 may
be read to demand a policy response. This article's influence depends on
ongoing collaboration between member states, as it "is fundamentally about
knowledge transfer and capacity building within the network of FCTC parties."3
Such collaboration, along with a growing body of evidence on the effects of ecigarettes, may make Article 22 a powerful tool for encouraging expansive FCTC
regulation.
B. The Force of the FCTC
Questions of legitimacy and enforceability are pervasive throughout
international law, and the FCTC is not immune to these concerns. The treaty
includes a set of guidelines and obligations, which are essentially binding, but in
light of the inability to override constitutional law and the general weaknesses of
international authority, it is fair to challenge the idea that countries can be held
accountable for complying with the Convention's instructions. An examination
of different countries' behaviors in response to the FCTC shows inconsistency
in compliance with certain explicit obligations, but suggests that the treaty exerts
a fairly heavy influence on its members.
This subsection addresses three conceptions of the overall strength of the
FCTC and whether it can practically bind its signatories. Some argue that the
Convention has no binding force at all. Others contend that future protocols can
overcome the weakness of the FCTC as originally drafted. A third category of
scholars is convinced that the text of the treaty itself is enough to establish its
binding authority. The most realistic assessment is that the success of the treaty
as binding authority hangs in the balance and depends on its interaction with
other existing international authorities. This Comment will address each of these
appraisals in turn.
1. The FCTC as a hollow document.

36

See id.art. 22.

37

Gary A. Giovino et al., Research Prioritiesfor FCTCArticles 20, 21, and 22: Surveillance/Evalualion and
Informafion Exchange, 15 OXFORD J. NICOTINE & TOBACCO RESEARCH 847, 847 (2013).
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Some scholars have read the provisions of the FCTC as "fundamentally
hortatory,"38 leaving signatories the option simply to disregard the Convention
and sculpt tobacco control policy at their discretion. Though the language of the
FCTC often takes on a mandatory form, critics argue that "[g]iven the degree to
which individual state's laws are given deference in the document.., it is
relatively easy for a state to ignore the FCTC's most strongly worded provisions
by simply invoking the trump card of national law."39 This contention is at odds
with the language of Article 13.40 The explicit text appears to defer only to
constitutions and constitutional principles, though these are vague terms, and
pushback against the idea of a strong international health treaty is reasonable
given the widespread skepticism surrounding the utility of international law. This
skepticism may be exacerbated by the FCTC's mixture of specific and general
instructions, rather than a bard set of binding directives.4 1
At the very least, this pessimistic view about the prospect of the FCTC as
an authoritative instrument for regulatory purposes deserves some credence
based on the historical reasoning behind the treaty. The Convention "was
designed as a compromise solution between a purely recommendatory
instrument and a binding convention, so as to engage countries in an
'incremental and flexible normative exercise' in a novel area." 42 The concept of
instructions that are stronger than recommendations-but not truly bindingcan be confusing and leaves doubt as to whether the FCTC should be the
driving force behind legislative action.
2. Eventual
protocols
current Convention.

as

effective

supplements

to

the

It is clear that "the FCTC include[s] both advisory and obligatory
language."43 Thus, even if the international community views the treaty as a
binding agreement, there is leeway for shirking some of its less straightforward
demands. Article 33 allows for additional protocols to the treaty, which are
inarguably binding on the parties that join them." The structure of the FCTC
38

Eric A. Feldman, The Culture of Legal Change. A Case St dy of Tobacco Control in Twen y-First Century
Japan, 27 MICH. J. INT'L L. 743, 782 (2006).

39

Id. at 782 n.155.

40

See text accompanying supra notes 27-30.
See Valentina S. Vadi, Global Health Governance at a Crossroads: Trademark Protection v. Tobacco Control

41

in International Investment Law, 48 STAN. J. INT'L L. 93, 102 (2012) ("[Als the provisions of the
FCTC present both general and specific elements, arbitrators may question the weight of its
nonetheless binding provisions.").
42

Halabi, supra note 12, at 124.

43

Sd. at 183.

44

See FCTC, supra note 6, art. 33.
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may in fact necessitate the supplementary force of protocols to effectively
operate at all.45 Protocols can add useful specificity to an instrument that
otherwise contains a substantial amount of general language. Indeed, it appears
that the text of the framework alone was always intended to be merely the first
step in a more robust regulatory system.46
This heavy reliance on protocols is troubling, given the lack of a timetable
for their addition to the framework. The creation of protocols is a permissive
power granted by the FCTC, not a required development-Article 33 states that
"[a]ny Party may propose protocols. 47 There is no guarantee that protocols will
be proposed, and the treaty contains no mechanism to ensure that their strategic
development will actually occur. In fact, the provisions of Article 33 make it
somewhat difficult to adopt a protocol. The COP must first undertake "every
effort... to reach consensus," and "as a last resort" may adopt a protocol by a
three-quarters majority vote. 48 Even te
then, it appears that becoming a party to a
protocol is optional, and protocols bind only "parties to the protocol in
question."4 9 The difficulty of effecting protocols helps to explain the fact that
only one such protocol, the Protocol to Eliminate Illicit Trade in Tobacco
Products, has been adopted since the ratification of the FCTC. Even this
protocol has not yet entered into force." Thus, if the argument that protocols
will be the driving force behind the FCTC's effectiveness is correct, the COP's
limited progress in adopting such protocols in the nine years since the
Convention took effect is highly discouraging.
3. The FCTC as legally binding.
Fortunately for those who view the FCTC as a potential source of
meaningful regulatory authority, there is an abundance of evidence and
scholarship suggesting that the Convention effectively binds its members."
4

See Vadi, supra note 41, at 101 ("Because of the specific binary framework/protocol approach,
framework conventions set general objectives and are to be supplemented by specialized
protocols.").

4

See Joseph N. Eckhardt, Balancing Interests in Free Trade and Health: How the WHO's Framework
Convention on Tobacco Control Can Withstand WTO Scrutiny, 12 DuKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 197, 217
(2002) ("The tobacco control regime will be implemented on a step-by-step basis, starting with a
simple framework to be followed by a series of binding protocols.").

47

FCTC, supranote 6, art. 33.1 (emphasis added).

48

See id.

49

See id.

50

See Protocol to Eliminate Illicit Trade in Tobacco Products, supra note 33.
See, for example, Alyssa Woo, Health Versus Trade: The Future of the WHO's Framework Convention on

51

Tobacco Control, 35 VAND.J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1731, 1731 (2002) (suggesting that the FCTC will not
be vulnerable to trade-based complaints); Allyn Taylor et al., Nonbinding L2gal Instruments in
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Widespread reliance on the Convention supports reading it as a legitimate
binding instrument. Countries "have massively adhered to the [FCTC], which
has established a 'cognitive and normative consensus' for promoting global
public health through tobacco control. ' 12 Scholars have recommended that the
FCTC "must play a role in the future directions of U.S. policy. 5 13 Some have
even argued that the Convention's guidelines, not merely its clearly
mandatory
4
law.
international
"soft"
than
rather
obligations, constitute "hard"
These observations, of course, have to be balanced against the legitimate
concerns raised by the two less optimistic readings of the FCTC. Realistically,
the FCTC cannot be effectively examined in a vacuum. Like all international law,
the treaty constantly interacts with domestic law and policy, as well as other
international sources of regulation addressing overlapping material. Before the
treaty was finalized, at least one commentator aptly noted that "the FCTC's
success depends on its ability to stand on its own as binding international law
among other binding international laws."5 5 The treaty's perceived success over
the near-decade since its entry into force may demonstrate its binding potential.
Such an inference would be even stronger if it were based on widespread
examples of adherence to the Convention. The next subsection explores this
evidence.
C. Levels of Compliance with FCTC Obligations
Several organizations have undertaken efforts to monitor compliance with
the FCTC. The Convention supplies a useful instrument for such supervision:
Article 21 mandates the reporting of certain information, primarily on measures
taken to implement the treaty. 6 Before the treaty entered into force, critics
dismissed the potential for this article to have a significant effect. Beyond the
reporting requirement, "the treaty lacks follow-up mechanisms to monitor States

52

72, 74 (2014) (noting the binding nature of the FCTC and its status as "one of the most widely
subscribed to treaties in the United Nations system"); tlona Kickbusch et al., Addressing Global
Health Governance Challenges Through a New Mechanism: The Proposalfor a Committee C of the World
HealthAssemby, 38 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 550, 553 (2010) (referring to the FCTC as a "successful"
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Parties' compliance with any recommendations that may be included in such
reports."" Post hoc evaluations of compliance, however, indicate that this may
not be as problematic as early skeptics of the FCTC predicted.
The Framework Convention Alliance (FCA) works with the Institute for
Global Tobacco Control at John Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health
to compile an annual report of the information gathered under Article 21
obligations.5 8 These annual reports are limited in that the reporting schedule for
parties is staggered based on when they ratified the Convention. Despite this, the
international community has produced a substantial amount of useful data, as
Phase I of reporting for the first forty-nine ratifying members of the FCTC took
place in 2007, and member countries submitted Phase II reports in 2011."9 The
reporting requirement itself was largely adhered to initially, as forty-three of the
forty-nine parties submitted reports to the Convention Secretariat in 2007.60
Enthusiasm apparently waned during the next four years; only twenty-nine of
these parties submitted their required reports by the next deadline. 61 However,
noncompliance does not appear to have been a conscious decision on the part
of the failing parties' governments, however. Rather, the salient issue appears to
be carelessness, as multiple noncompliant parties cited forgetfulness or a need
for reminders as the reason for failing to report.62 This lack of clear opposition
to reporting may comfort FCTC proponents, but it may also be a sign that the
treaty is not being taken particularly seriously.
In addition, the FCA attempts to monitor compliance with Article 8's
provisions for protection from exposure to tobacco smoke. This article is facially
more demanding than Article 21 and is also more difficult to measure, as there is
no deadline specified in the Convention for meeting Article 8's associated
obligations. While most FCTC members have taken steps to implement rules
consistent with Article 8, almost a third had made "little to no progress" as of
2010.63 On the other hand, ten countries had comprehensive smoke-free air
policies at the national level, sixteen had strong policies with limited exceptions,
and five had comprehensive or strong policies at a sub-national level (including
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64
Australia, where 99% of the country is covered by strong local legislation).
6
entirely.
products
tobacco
of
sale
Additionally, Bhutan has banned the
Adherence to the Article 1I's instructions for packaging and labeling varies
widely across countries. Compliance with this article is also difficult to measure
because its provisions are fairly vague and contain both mandatory and
voluntary language. The most salient requirement is that warnings about the
harmful effects of tobacco must take up at least 30% of the display areas on
tobacco product packaging.6 6 Of forty-eight countries for which the FCA
collected data, thirty-seven had enacted laws to this effect.67
Article 13, which regulates tobacco advertising, promotion, and
sponsorship, presents compliance measurement difficulties for countries whose
constitutions prevent them from placing a "comprehensive ban on
advertising. ' 68 Furthermore, the FCTC does not specify precisely what
advertising "restrictions" entail. Despite this source of confusion, the FCA
gathered observational data on Article 13 compliance, but conclusions were
limited by a lack of data, a consequence that stems partially from noncompliance with the reporting requirements of Article 21.69 Several reporting
countries displayed either unwarranted self-evaluation or confusion regarding
the Article 13 requirements; fourteen of twenty-three governments claimed to
have a comprehensive ban on tobacco advertising, but only nine were fully
compliant with outdoor bans and ten with print media marketing bans.7"
Similarly, seven countries claimed to have a point-of-sale (POS)ban, and only
one of these countries (Jordan) had a POS ban with no violations.7 1 The lack of
compliance with Article 13 lends credence to the common criticisms of the
FCTC, though this evidence is far from conclusive in light of the measurement
difficulties presented by the language of the article and the fact that it is likely to
implicate the treaty's constitutional exception.
Outside of the FCA, other NGOs have performed their own evaluations
of the FCTC's efficacy. The International Tobacco Control Policy Evaluation
Project (ITC Project) is one such organization. Geoffrey T. Fong of the Ontario
Institute for Cancer Research presented the ITC project findings in September
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2013.72 Fong concluded that current domestic policies are inadequate and that
the potential for "unintended consequences" of the FCTC is overstated. 3
Basic treaty interpretation, the weight of scholarship, compliance with the
FCTC, and empirical evidence all support the contention that the Convention is
a binding legal document. Even considering the general weaknesses of
international laws, the largely adherent international response to the passage of
the FCTC demonstrates its significant influence, providing a seemingly
legitimate foundation upon which to regulate the e-cigarette industry.

III.

CURRENT REGULATION OF E-CIGARETTES

Pressure to regulate e-cigarettes mounts worldwide as the popularity of
these relatively new devices continues to grow. Some analysts predict that the74
sales of e-cigarettes will surpass traditional cigarette sales within a decade.
Among young Americans, this phenomenon already appears to have taken place,
as e-cigarette use among teenagers had surpassed the use of traditional cigarettes
as of December 2014."s What should be done about this trend is the subject of
much debate. It is unclear whether e-cigarettes are best classified as an
alternative to traditional tobacco cigarettes, a form of treatment, a gateway
product, or something entirely different, and there is competing evidence within
the scientific community. 76 Before reaching that issue, however, it is instructive
to examine some of the possible approaches to e-cigarette regulation that major
governments have applied. These include not regulating e-cigarettes at all,
regulating them in the same fashion as traditional tobacco products, or
classifying them as medicine or nicotine replacement therapy.
A. No Regulation

72

73
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2014),
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Many advocate treating e-cigarettes the same as any general good that can
be legally sold. Apart from the purely libertarian view promoting the free trade
of goods, scientists and academics who see e-cigarettes as a substitute for
traditional tobacco products believe that regulating these devices would inhibit a
chief reducer of tobacco use." Whether for this reason or simply because of a
slow legislative process, the U.S. currently does not federally regulate ecigarettes.78 Similarly, the e-cigarette industry in China operates in a "regulatory
void."79 U.S. tobacco control laws do not address e-cigarettes because the
relevant federal statute covers only products that are "made or derived from
tobacco that is intended for human consumption, including any component,
part, or accessory of a tobacco product." 8 This language may leave open the
argument that nicotine qualifies as a component or part of tobacco products,
and the statute could therefore be read to cover e-cigarettes. This argument is
addressed in the following subsection.
B. E-Cigarettes as Tobacco Products
If e-cigarettes are to be regulated under the FCTC, then classifying them as
tobacco products or their equivalent would be the most straightforward method
of demonstrating the Convention's applicability. The European Union has taken
the lead in adopting policies that at least highly resemble this approach. In
February 2014, the European Commission approved revisions of the EU
Tobacco Products Directive, the scope of which has now been broadened to
cover e-cigarettes.8' The new directive regulates nicotine-containing e-cigarettes
in essentially the same way as traditional tobacco products, but does not impose
the same restrictions on medicinal e-cigarettes.82 Whether this regulatory strategy
is viable remains to be determined, as the U.K.'s largest e-cigarette manufacturer
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See, for example, Zachary Cahn & Michael Siegel, Electronic Cigarettes as a Harm Reduction Strategy for
Tobacco ControkA Step Forward or a Repeat of Past Mistakes?, 32J. PUB. HEALTH POL'Y 16, 24 (2011).
The latter explanation seems more likely, as the FDA issued preliminary rules that would prohibit
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WALL ST. J. (an. 30, 2015), http://wwv.wsj.com/articles/states-dash-to-regulate-e-cigarettes1422668141.
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is challenging the validity of the EU Tobacco Products Directive (TPD) at the
Court of Justice of the EU (CJ). 83 If the CJ finds that the new directive is valid, it
would be a boon for international supporters of e-cigarette regulation under the
FCTC as precedent for the position that there is no disconnect between the
content of the Convention and e-cigarettes.
As noted above, federal regulation in the U.S. has not taken this form, but
case law and FDA proposals suggest that e-cigarettes could be regulated as
tobacco products under most circumstances. In Sottera, Inc. v. Food & Drug
Administralion, an e-cigarette distributor sought a preliminary injunction
preventing the FDA from regulating e-cigarettes under the Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act (FDCA). The Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit granted the
preliminary injunction, holding that the "FDA lacks FDCA drug/device
authority to regulate all tobacco products marketed without claims of therapeutic
effect.""5 But if e-cigarettes are marketed with claims of therapeutic effect, then
the FDA's drug/device provisions give the agency the authority to regulate.86
And the Court found that if nicotine-containing e-cigarettes are marketed without
claims of therapeutic effect, the FDA may regulate them under the Tobacco
Control Act instead.87 Though the FDA was arguing for the ability to regulate ecigarettes under the FDCA at the time, it appears to have changed its strategy
since Sottera was decided. In 2014, the FDA proposed a "deeming rule" to
regulate e-cigarettes as tobacco products.88 If the rule is adopted, then the U.S.
and EU will each have laws regulating e-cigarettes as tobacco products.
The potential success of the U.S. and EU regulatory approaches to ecigarettes may have competing implications for the FCTC. Some might argue
that the treaty is useless when it comes to e-cigarettes, as governments will
eventually adopt whatever policies they deem effective. Others might see the
new U.S. and EU laws as a victory for the treaty, as the courts of these two
major international powers have now found language similar to that in the
FCTC applicable to e-cigarettes. Given the general trend of adherence to the
Convention, it may only be a matter of time until stronger e-cigarette policies are
adopted pursuant to FCTC obligations.
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C. E-Cigarettes as Medicine
Designating e-cigarettes as medical devices is another possible strategy for
subjecting them to regulation. In the U.S., the FDA can regulate e-cigarettes
when they are marketed as therapeutic.89 Prior to Sottera, the FDA tried to
regulate all e-cigarettes under the FDCA as "drug-device combination[s]." 90
While U.S. courts have found this type of authority to be too broad for the
FDA, the concept appears to be well within governments' capacities to explore
further.
Other countries have taken more assertive approaches to reaching similar
policy ends. For example, in New Zealand, e-cigarettes that contain nicotine are
regulated under the Medicines Act.9 1 The drawback to this classification is that,
because medicines and medical devices are typically some of the most strictly
regulated products, it could lead "to the paradoxical situation in which ecigarettes are treated more harshly than tobacco products that are known to be
very harmful. 9 2 Regulating e-cigarettes as medicine thus has the perverse effect
of shifting consumption from a likely healthier alternative to traditional tobacco
products back to regular cigarettes. This type of policy seems to run directly
counter to the goals of the FCTC. Restricting the ability of e-cigarettes to
compete with cigarettes in the marketplace exacerbates a universally established
public health risk and may renormalize smoking to an even further extent than
the widespread popularity of e-cigarettes allegedly already threatens to do.93
Despite these seemingly powerful criticisms, countries other than New
Zealand regulate e-cigarettes as medical devices. The U.K. decided in 2013 to
regulate all nicotine-containing products as medicines under the Medicines and
Healthcare Products Regulatory Agency.9 4 The government does not appear to
be dismissing the idea that e-cigarettes may effectively promote the cessation of
smoking tobacco (in fact, calling e-cigarettes "medicine" seems to embrace the
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idea), but wants to ensure that "people using these products have the confidence
that they are safe, are of the right quality and work.""5
D. Outright Bans
Nothing prevents a country or local governing body from enacting outright
bans on e-cigarettes. This would be an extreme step, though, even beyond the
WHO's call for an indoor ban.96 The possibility of a complete ban in the future
seems unlikely. More common approaches are bans of specific types of ecigarettes (such as flavored e-cigarettes7), bans in specific places (such as public
areas 98 or indoors 99), or bans on sales to minors.' 0 This Comment will not
address bans in detail, as they are uncommon. And because the FCA has
encouraged treaty members to regulate tobacco products more strictly than the
FCTC requires, 1 1 the countries applying bans are likely already complying with
the FCTC and would be unaffected by a determination of whether the treaty
may apply to e-cigarettes.
The specifics of each FCTC member's current policies obviously vary
widely and will likely continue to do so. There are arguments in both directions
about whether any policy is consistent with the demands of the FCTC. While it
is clearly possible to enact e-cigarette regulation without guidance from the
FCTC, these examples may also serve as frameworks for more specific binding
international regulations that can promote consistency across countries, as
mounting scientific evidence continues to reveal the healthiest methods for
addressing e-cigarettes. The next section describes some of the WHO's efforts
95
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to use the FCTC as a vehicle for this purpose and the justifications for such
efforts.

IV.

ATTEMPTS TO REGULATE E-CIGARETTES UNDER THE

FCTC

A. Historical Approach to E-Cigarettes
Though there is little scholarship assessing the applicability of the FCTC to
e-cigarettes, the WHO has certainly contemplated international regulation of the
devices under the treaty. Although there is no indication that the original treaty
contemplated e-cigarettes, this is unsurprising, as e-cigarettes did not enter the
market until 2004-after the WHO had already begun drafting the
Convention.10 2 Since then, the explosion of the e-cigarette market has forced the
WHO and FCTC members to consider the products and their effect on the
tobacco market and public health. In 2010, the COP acknowledged the
"regulatory gap" that e-cigarettes present for the FCTC. 10 3 Member countries
also acknowledged the increasing role that e-cigarettes may play in the public
health debate, and "policymakers and regulators in many countries have sought
guidance from WHO on the scientific evidence-base and optimal regulatory
approaches to be taken with regard to these products." ' 4
Despite the demonstrable awareness of the issues presented by e-cigarettes,
the 2010 FCA policy briefing did not answer whether the scope of the FCTC
encompasses e-cigarettes. The report noted that e-cigarettes "could ...be
considered tobacco products" but concluded that "[[it is not necessary at this
time for the Conference of the Parties to make a decision as to whether
electronic cigarettes fall within the scope of the FCTC."' ' For certain parts of
the treaty, the FCA explicitly abdicated responsibility for e-cigarette regulation:
"FCA recommends against referring the matter of electronic cigarettes to the
working group on Articles 9 and 10, as the issue of e-cigarettes is largely
unrelated to the matters which the working group was mandated to deal with."1"6
Following the policy briefing, the COP largely delegated the burden of dealing
102
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with e-cigarettes to national policymakers, instructing regulators to "collaborate
in assessing the regulatory framework within their own countries to determine
the most effective means of regulating (or possibly banning) Electronic Nicotine
Delivery Systems to protect public health."10 7 Thus, as of 2010, it looked as
though members of the FCTC were more confident in the ability of national
governments to regulate e-cigarettes and comfortable with the original domain
of the FCTC.
A changing of the guard occurred between 2010 and 2014, however, as ecigarettes rose in popularity. FCTC parties learned more about possible links
between e-cigarettes and traditional tobacco products, and many saw fit to
address the related challenges on the international stage.0 8 Continuing research
and trends in policymaking over those four years apparently influenced member
nations to address e-cigarettes, as the Sixth Conference of the Parties (COP-6)
included a specific report on ENDS, recommending that parties regulate them
both as tobacco products and as medical products." 9 COP-6 used permissive
language regarding e-cigarettes, but invited parties "to consider prohibiting or
regulating ENDS/ENNDS, including as tobacco products, medicinal products,
consumer products, or other categories, as appropriate, taking into account a
high level of protection for human health." ' 0 This report seems to support
incorporation of e-cigarettes into the FCTC's regulatory domain, identifying
them as a target of the Convention's objectives. The chosen language is not
binding, but the report still reveals the Parties' expanding perception of the
appropriate scope of international regulation. The presence of binding language
elsewhere in the treaty coupled with the explicit consideration of e-cigarettes as
part of the Convention's intended regulatory system indicates that party
members believe it could serve as a legitimate source of authority for e-cigarette
regulation. This idea is further supported by the fact that legal challenges come
almost exclusively from the tobacco industry and have not significantly hindered
the growing influence of the FCTC.
B. Textual Basis for E-Cigarette Regulation
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The significance of the COP's contemplation of e-cigarettes is debatable.
There was never a question about whether countries were allowed to regulate ecigarettes, and the FCTC's recommendations, while potentially influential, do
not present an interesting legal question. Controversy would arise, however, if
the FCTC required certain regulations for e-cigarettes, as it does for traditional
tobacco products. Section I1 identified several possible textual hooks on which
WHO officials or parties to the convention could potentially rely as a legitimate
source for such requirements. Classifying e-cigarettes as a tobacco product is not
as faithful to the text of the FCTC as it is to that of the U.S. Tobacco Act. In
contrast to that Act, there is no "derived from" clause in the FCTC definition;
tobacco products must be "made of the leaf tobacco."1' ' Thus, the best
arguments for mandatory regulation of e-cigarettes are based on expansive
readings of Articles 8, 14, and 22, which together may be interpreted as requiring
e-cigarette regulation if scientific evidence suggests that e-cigarette regulation is
necessary to accomplish the goals of the treaty.
E-cigarettes do not produce tobacco smoke, and therefore do not appear
to be covered by Article 8, the portion of the FCTC that most directly addresses
the treaty's primary goal: "protection from exposure to tobacco smoke."' 1 2 The
concept of expressio unius suggests the negative inference that the inclusion of
tobacco smoke in the article implies the exclusion of other potential targets of
regulation. It remains possible, however, to read Article 8 in a manner that
would allow for e-cigarettes to fall within its purview. The phrase "[p]rotection
from exposure to tobacco smoke" does not necessarily imply that Article 8 only
requires regulation of products that produce tobacco smoke. If research suggests
that controlling the marketing, sale, or use of e-cigarettes has a negative effect on
tobacco smoke exposure, then e-cigarette-related measures could provide indirect
protection from exposure, as promoted by Article 8. Although the treaty
stipulates that tobacco smoke is the only source of harm that the FCTC seeks to
address, nothing in the Convention precludes measures that indirectly tackle this
issue.
The second important element of Article 8 is the use of the word
"effective." '1 3 In the context of that article, effective measures "require the total
elimination of smoking and tobacco smoke in a particular space or environment
in order to create a 100% smoke free environment." ' While this may seem to
require no less than a ban on tobacco products, the WHO guidelines also
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encourage adoption of the "best practice" in implementing smoke-free
measures, leaving policymakers some discretion to act in accordance with
developing scientific consensus."' The Framework Convention Alliance, a
multinational confederation of organizations that supports the FCTC, has
argued that "effective" means "evidence-based."". 6 This heightens the
significance of the treaty's self-described reliance on scientific, technical, and
economic considerations. Future research on e-cigarettes and policies addressing
them will play a key role in determining whether the FCTC is a legitimate source
of justification for such policies. That determination will, in turn, depend on
whether e-cigarette regulation can be shown empirically to reduce (or increase)
the use of traditional tobacco products or their associated consequences.
It should be noted that the word "effective," as used in the sense described
above, appears in the FCTC twenty-six times. Its presence in Article 8 is the
most straightforward indicator of its relevance as a factor in assessing the
FCTC's ability to regulate e-cigarettes, but the overall prevalence of the idea of
effectiveness serves as further evidence that the FCTC can only be a meaningful
regulatory tool if the policies it spurs actually achieve their goals. The weight of
evidence may eventually suggest that e-cigarette regulation is necessary to
effectively protect the public from the harms of exposure to tobacco smoke and
achieve the goals of Article 8. This could be the case if e-cigarette critics are
correct about the normalizing impact that these products may have on smoking.
But if e-cigarettes are shown to be merely a healthier substitute for cigarettes and
to reduce the overall production of tobacco smoke, then a hands-off policy
almost seems required by the FCTC, due to its emphasis on developing
"effective" policies.
Article 14 is the best hook for FCTC guidance on e-cigarettes if the use of
the products is in fact an effective cessation tactic. It states: "Each Party shall
develop and disseminate appropriate, comprehensive and integrated guidelines
based on scientific evidence and best practices, taking into account national
circumstances and priorities, and shall take effective measures to promote
' 17
cessation of tobacco use and adequate treatment for tobacco dependence."
The primary argument in favor of allowing the unrestricted marketing and sale
of e-cigarettes is that they represent an effective tool to fight tobacco

11
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dependence)" If this is the case, then the most intuitive approach would be a
hands-off policy towards e-cigarettes, as regulation would interfere with the
positive impact the devices could have on cessation. At most, many have argued,
e-cigarette regulation should be minimal.119 The prospect of e-cigarettes as a
healthier alternative to traditional tobacco products may appear to cut against
the concept of the FCTC as a regulatory instrument for e-cigarettes, but it may
not implicate the treaty's applicabiliy to the products. Instead, this notion could
dictate the form of the FCTC's demands on its members. The guidelines that
Article 14 requires parties to issue could include mandatory distribution of
information regarding the positive effects of e-cigarettes and, at the extreme,
could encourage subsidization. On the other hand, if the weight of scientific
evidence suggests that e-cigarettes are not an effective method to promote
cessation, and that normalization and gateway effects outweigh their substitution
effects, then Article 14 seems like an effective textual hook for e-cigarette
regulation that closely resembles that of traditional tobacco products.
Finally, the broad language of Article 22 ("[c]ooperation in the scientific,
technical, and legal fields and provision of related expertise")120 may be useful in
finding applicability of the FCTC to e-cigarettes. If the contents of the Foreword
and Preamble were not enough to ensure parties understand that the demands
of the Convention are intertwined with scientific progress, this article clarifies
that point. The growing body of tobacco-related research and the development
of new technologies (such as e-cigarettes) that may influence the effects of
tobacco regulation will change the nature of the FCTC over time. Article 22 is
yet another strong anchor in the text of the treaty justifying an international
policy concerning e-cigarettes.
Article 17, titled "Provision of support for economically viable
alternatives," deserves attention as well.' The article refers to suppliers of
tobacco, not to consumers. This article could become relevant if e-cigarettes are
in fact a safer and economically viable alternative (which they appear to be).
Supporting the e-cigarette industry, then, may become a function of the FCTC.
This may be more difficult to implement in practice. The FCTC requires
adoption of effective measures, but has no authority to prohibit adoption of
118
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ineffective measures, so preventing e-cigarette regulation likely presents a larger
challenge than validating such regulation. Additionally, it may be politically
impossible for a young, controversial international treaty to require subsidization
of an industry such as e-cigarettes, so it is unclear how Article 17 can be
implemented in practice if it is in fact relied upon to address e-cigarettes.
Textual interpretation of the relevant articles of the FCTC strongly
suggests that mounting scientific evidence could trigger applicability of the treaty
to devices such as e-cigarettes. International courts have not weighed in
significantly on this idea, as most cases have focused on the constitutionality of
tobacco-related taxes or packaging requirements.122 The Supreme Court of
Canada, however, has noted that domestic policies have responded to the
growing body of evidence about secondhand smoke, and that the FCTC "is one
of the most widely embraced of multilateral treaties.,' 123 Given widespread
support for the Convention and the WHO's continual efforts to respond to
scientific developments,2 mounting evidence about the effects of e-cigarette
usage on smoking habits would likely trigger at least functional authority for the
FCTC to regulate the devices.
V.

SCIENTIFIC UNCERTAINTY AND THE INADEQUACY OF THE
PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE

Setting aside these considerations, there appear to be plenty of ways for the
FCTC to implement binding e-cigarette-related obligations. The remaining
question is if it should. This is more than a simple policy matter; it implicates the
role international conventions should play in shaping policy as well as
international law principles regarding regulation.
A. The Academic and Medical Community's Lack of Consensus
The goal of the FCTC, in a nutshell, is to reduce tobacco use. Does
regulating e-cigarettes help or hinder that goal? Opinions are divided, and the
evidence is conflicting. Many theorize that a minimalist approach to e-cigarette
regulation is optimal. 2 ' The main motivating factor is the potential for smokers
to switch to a less hazardous alternative, potentially saving hundreds of
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thousands of lives in the U.S. alone.126 Recent studies showing that e-cigarettes
do decrease tobacco dependence bolster the minimalist argument.1 27 Results
consistently demonstrate that using e-cigarettes is more effective in eliminating
tobacco cravings than quitting cold turkey, leading to high rates of complete
abstinence from tobacco and even higher rates of reduced use.128 The research
suggests that, perhaps 129counterintuitively, e-cigarettes may serve as a gateway out
of smoking cigarettes.

In spite of this research, it is still possible to argue that e-cigarettes can
cause harm. Many medical experts worry, for example, that
e-cigarette use may encourage higher consumption of nicotine, may
perpetuate smokers' addiction to nicotine making them less susceptible to
quitting altogether, may expose users to the risk of accidental ingestion of eliquid or as yet unknown health risks from long-term e-cigarette use, may
make smoking socially acceptable again thus undermining current nosmoking policies, and may act as a gateway to tobacco, especially for
130
youngsters.

There is less data supporting these more pessimistic viewpoints, but the
novelty of e-cigarettes means that there is a lack of long-term data, and
skepticism is probably healthy. Blind faith in the efficacy of e-cigarettes as a
cessation tool may also be dangerous because "some consumers may forego
proven cessation methods due to [reliance on e-cigarettes]." 131 Aside from the
uncertainty surrounding e-cigarettes' medical usefulness, there are further
concerns about the potentially harmful effects of their vaporized ingredients,
13 2
which, even if less harmful than tobacco, may cause long-term damage.
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The status of e-cigarettes in the scientific community is unresolved. How
international law tends to approach unresolved scientific questions that relate to
potential regulation may dictate the future role of the FCTC.
B. The Precautionary Principle and its Practical Impotence
One source of guidance commonly considered in international law is the
precautionary principle, which "reflects the classic adage: Better safe than
sorry."' 3 3 More specifically, "the principle imposes a burden of proof on those
who create potential risks, and it requires regulation of activities even if it cannot
'
be shown that those activities are likely to produce significant harms."134
The
principle is highly influential, particularly in the area of international
environmental law. International bodies have heavily relied on the principle in
drafting environmental treaties, declarations, and resolutions.'35 Thus, it would
be unsurprising to refer to the precautionary principle to justify the regulation of
e-cigarettes under the FCTC. Already, "[m]any public health researchers have
adopted a better-safe-than-sorry approach to regulating electronic cigarettes in
general, advocating regulation, or even removal from the market, until research
shows the devices are safe."' 3 6
Although most of the precautionary principle's influence has come in the
field of environmental law,'37 several scholars have previously suggested its
potential application to e-cigarette regulation. 38 Daniela Saitta argues that the
principle is particularly well-suited for this area because "risk assessment
studies ... [would necessitate] many years to complete."' 3 9 There is reason to
believe, however, that the principle is far less useful in this field and would likely
be detrimental to the development of effective policy.
While any type of regulation has associated costs, regulating e-cigarettes
differs from environmental regulation in one critical respect. Environmental
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regulations, while potentially expensive and ineffective, typically pose no risk of
making the environment worse off if they turn out to be failures. E-cigarette
regulations, on the other hand, could actually have harmful public health
benefits. It is unclear who is actually creating more risk to consumers in this
case: e-cigarette manufacturers and distributors or regulators. Who should bear
the burden of proof for justifying e-cigarette policy?
Cass Sunstein characterized this problem by arguing that, in its strong
form, the precautionary principle offers no real guidance because, "in the
relevant cases, every step, including inaction, creates a risk to health, the
environment, or both., 140 These risks are particularly high in the case of ecigarettes, suggesting that another mechanism would be more helpful than the
precautionary principle. What the FCTC, as an evidence-based treaty, truly
demands is a robust risk-balancing system. Though this will take time, the treaty
is designed to evolve alongside scientific progress. It does not and should not
demand an immediate solution, especially considering the fact that each
individual member of the Convention faces different risks and legal barriers to
implementing a regulatory scheme.
Interestingly, resisting regulation of e-cigarettes appears to be consistent
with the principle's core tenets. While there are many unanswered questions
about e-cigarettes, most available evidence suggests that they are safer than
traditional tobacco products. 41 Thus, the precautionary approach would seem to
suggest that any action that would shift consumption from e-cigarettes to
tobacco should be avoided. In the status quo, the FCTC does not regulate ecigarettes. The would-be regulators are the parties who would be introducing a
new risk; the sale and use of e-cigarettes already exists. Requiring government
regulators to carry the burden of proof is at odds with the traditional "Strong
Precautionary Principle," which, by definition, "shifts the burden of proof...
' However, the international legal
from government regulators to private firms."142
community has sometimes followed a "weak" version of the precautionary
principle, which merely allows for regulation in the face of scientific uncertainty
without shifting the burden of proof away from governments. 143 This application
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of the principle is embraced in the Rio Declaration, which specifically adopts a
"precautionary approach" to environmental protection.'4
The weak version of the precautionary principle may do nothing more than
"state a truism, one that is uncontroversial and necessary only to combat public
confusion or the self-interested claims of private groups demanding
unambiguous evidence of harm, which no rational society requires. 14' However,
considering the lack of knowledge on the substitution effects of regulating ecigarettes, an intuitive conception of the "better safe than sorry" truism is
appropriate. At present, there is no satisfying answer to the question of ecigarette regulation in domestic law, much less in international law. Although the
FCTC could exercise legitimate power to require regulation of e-cigarettes, there
is not strong scientific support to do so, and one of the most prevalent guiding
principles of international law does not alleviate this dilemma. The prudent
decision, until the scientific community provides more reliable answers, is to
step back from the issue.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Because of the FCTC's self-described nature as an "evidence-based treaty,"
the obligation it imposes to interact with the scientific community, and its
mandates to implement "effective" measures, the ability (and even legality) of
the FCTC to regulate e-cigarettes depends on further conclusions about the
effect of e-cigarettes on consumer behavior. A comparison to certain national
regulations of e-cigarettes suggests that the FCTC could regulate them as
tobacco products, though this does not appear to be faithful to the text of the
Convention. It would be consistent, however, to regulate e-cigarettes under the
FCTC based on its enumerated goals and the vehicles it provides to accomplish
them. This is only true, however, if regulation actually would be effective in
doing so. The precautionary principle is less helpful to the case for regulation
than some scholars would argue because it is regulation that presents the
unknown risk, whereas the status quo is not nearly as murky. If anything, the
principle may support a prohibition on regulating e-cigarettes, which would be
an unprecedented role for international health law. The FCTC may be a broader
and more powerful tool than even its framers originally conceived. But when it
comes to e-cigarettes, the exercise of this power that is most faithful to the
treaty's intentions is, unsatisfyingly, to do nothing at all.
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